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BANKRUPTCY

In re Brayshaw, 912 F.2d 1255
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Brayshaw, filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition claiming exempt property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(1). Pursuant to Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 4003(b), objections to exempt property must be filed within
thirty days after the creditors' meeting, unless the court grants an extension of time. On the thirtieth day, after the creditor's meeting, the
trustee in bankruptcy filed a motion to extend the time for objections.
This motion was granted by the bankruptcy court after the thirty day
expiration period. The district court, however, granted Brayshaw leave
to take an interlocutory appeal and reversed the bankruptcy court's extension order. Clark presented two issues on appeal: (1) whether the
district court's order was an appealable final order; and (2) whether the
bankruptcy court had power to grant a motion to extend time for objection after the expiration of the thirty day time period.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the extension of time. First, the court noted that it had jurisdiction in bankruptcy
cases only when the district courts have exercised appellate jurisdiction
and granted final orders. Accordingly, since the district court's reversal
of the extension of time had the effect of granting Brayshaw's exemptions, it was a final appealable order. Second, the court held that the
district court properly reversed the extension of time order granted by
the bankruptcy court. The court reasoned that a bankruptcy court can
extend the period for objections to exemptions only by acting within the
original thirty day time period. Consequently, since the bankruptcy
court granted Clark the extension after the thirty day time period expired, it acted improperly.
In re Bucyrus Grain Co., 905 F.2d 1362
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Bucyrus Grain Company ("Bucyrus") accepted money from Carl
and Robert Anderson (the "Andersons") to place an order for commodity futures. Soon thereafter, Bucyrus filed bankruptcy. State Bank of
Spring Hill motioned for relief from the bankruptcy stay to permit it to
setoff the funds in Bucyrus's account against Bucyrus's outstanding debt
to it. The bankruptcy court granted the bank's motion. The Andersons
appealed, and the district court reversed. The court ruled that the
Andersons had priority over the bank because Bucyrus was a "commodities broker," the Andersons were "customers," and certain funds in
Bucyrus's accounts were "customer property." The district court remanded the case for valuation of the Andersons' claim. The bank subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the bank's appeal for lack ofjurisdic-
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tion. The court held that the appeal was premature because the district
court's remand for valuation of the Andersons' claim constituted a remand for "significant further proceedings." The court added that the
bank's notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed until after
the bankruptcy court entered its decisions on remand. Moreover, the
proper appeal from that decision was to the district court.
In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514
Author: Judge Anderson
The Trustees of Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund
notified Centric Corporation ("Centric") that it was found to have withdrawn from the fund and was accountable for withdrawal liability under
ERISA. Centric sought a declaratory judgment that it incurred no liability. The Trustees counterclaimed for the amount of the assessed withdrawal liability. Centric's subsequent bankruptcy filing resulted in the
district court proceedings being stayed and then terminated. The Trustees filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court and were granted a relief
from stay. After Centric objected to the Trustees' claim, the Trustees
failed to respond until seven months after the time allowed. During the
interim, the bankruptcy court approved a liquidation plan. When the
Trustees belatedly moved to respond to Centric's objection, the bankruptcy court denied the motion and disallowed the claim. The Trustees
moved to reopen the district court case twenty months after it had been
dismissed. The district court ruled that their withdrawal claim was
barred by the doctrine of laches and affirmed the bankruptcy court disallowance of their claim against Centric. The Trustees appealed both
orders.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court orders. The bankruptcy
court correctly reasoned that allowing the Trustees to respond after the
seven month delay would prejudice Centric and delay the termination of
the bankruptcy proceedings. Further, the Trustees had no reason not to
respond promptly. The court also approved the district court's reasoning in its dismissal of the counterclaims. The court explained that the
doctrine of laches could apply since the twenty month delay appeared
unjustified and resulted in prejudice to Centric.
In re Elec. Metal Products, Inc., 916 F.2d 1502
Per Curiam
In consideration for two payments on antecedent debt totalling
$5,100, defendant, attorney Bittman, agreed to continue working on a
case for plaintiff, Electronic Metal Products, Incorporated ("EMP").
This case resulted in a $42,000 gain to EMP. EMP thereafter declared
bankruptcy and brought suit to recover $5,100 as a preferential transfer.
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to EMP, but the district court reversed, holding that the payments constituted "new value"
and thus were insulated from recovery. EMP subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the
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bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment to EMP. In regard to legal. representation, the court extended the general rule that a
creditor's promise to continue to do business with a debtor, if its bills
are paid, is not new value. This is because: (1) to hold otherwise would
allow attorney payments on antecedent debt to be insulated from recovery; (2) there was no evidence that the $42,000 settlement was directly
attributable to Bittman's promise to continue working; and (3) although
continuing Bittman's legal representation may have been more efficient,
it was indistinguishable from the efficiency of continuing certain business relationships covered by the general rule. The court also held that
even though Bittman released his charging lien to the extent of the payments, new value was not given. The court explained that liens are enforceable against third parties only if notice of the lien is filed with the
court. Bittman failed to do this. Thus, the release of the lien did not
constitute a release of security to third parties such as EMP's other creditors. Finally, the court refused to recognize the "net result rule" utilized under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. The court reasoned that
legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code does not support application of the rule to the 1978 Code.
In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Research-Planning Incorporated ("Research") appealed a
bankruptcy and district court decision which held that certain funds
placed in escrow constituted part of the bankruptcy estate. Research,
which placed $260,000 in escrow with First Capital Mortgage, sought
the return of $62,000 after it declared bankruptcy. Research claimed
that the funds were not available for creditors as part of the bankruptcy
estate. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
bankruptcy and district courts. The court held that the funds never became part of the bankruptcy estate and, thus, were recoverable as funds
held in trust for the escrow depositor.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the panel decision. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the funds recovered by the trustee in settlement of his preference actions comprised
part of the bankruptcy estate. The court held that Research was not
entitled to preferential status of the funds. The court based its decision
on the character of the funds once they were recovered and the specific
language of the Bankruptcy Code, § 550(a), which allows recovery of the
property "for the benefit of the estate."
In re Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515
Per Curiam
Defendant, United States, appealed a district court decision affirming a bankruptcy court order. The order ruled that a tax lien on
defendant Billie Gardner's property was extinguished by an award of the
property to plaintiff, Terryl Gardner, in a state court divorce proceed-
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ing. Mrs. Gardner's interests in the property were, therefore, held superior to those of the United States. On appeal, the government claimed
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to determine the priority of two
competing third party lienors over exempt property.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that Mr.
Gardner had no interest in the marital property after the divorce decree.
The court, however, vacated and remanded that part of the ruling adjudicating the rights of the government and Mrs. Gardner. The court
ruled that once the bankruptcy court determined Mr. Gardner had no
interest in the property following the divorce decree, the bankruptcy
court lacked further jurisdiction. Essentially, the bankruptcy court did
not have the authority to determine whether Mrs. Gardner's interests in
the property were superior to the interests of the United States. The
court explained that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction only over core
and related proceedings. Determining the rights of third parties is not a
core proceeding. Moreover, it was not a related proceeding because the
case involved a conflict over property no longer a part of the bankruptcy
estate.
In re Gerlach, 897 F.2d 1048
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, John Deere Company ("John Deere"), appealed the district court's order that the entire debt of defendant, Gerlach, was dischargeable. On appeal, John Deere contended that the debt Gerlach
owed was not dischargeable because it was procured through fraud.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court stated that
pursuant to § 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, an objecting creditor
need only prove that credit was obtained by fraud for the debt to be
nondischargeable. Consequently, the court remanded for the district
court to determine the amount of guaranty debt Gerlach obtained
through fraud.
In re Grey, 902 F.2d 1479
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Coats State Bank (the "Bank"), challenged the dischargeability of defendant Grey's loan obligation. The bankruptcy court
determined that Grey's obligation to the Bank was exempt from discharge in the amount of $71,000. Grey appealed on four grounds:
(1) the security agreement did not include after-acquired property;
(2) the bankruptcy court's determination of damages was erroneous;
(3) the bankruptcy court erred in determining debtor's sale of collateral
was malicious; and (4) the bankruptcy court erred in admitting the altered security agreement into evidence.
First, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court did not err in
determining the included after-acquired property. The court explained
that even though a security agreement does not specifically use the
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phrase "after-acquired property," the security agreement will include it
if that was the intent of the parties. Second, the court held that Grey's
sale of collateral was malicious. The court explained that maliciousness
was established because it was reasonably foreseeable that Grey's conduct would result in injury to the bank. Third, the bankruptcy court
properly admitted the security agreement into evidence, even though it
allegedly contained written alterations. The court explained that Grey
failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing error. Moreover, the
court noted that authentication of a document is left to the discretion of
the trial judge and will not be disturbed without a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Finally, the court rejected Grey's contention that the
bankruptcy court's factual determination of damages was unduly speculative. The court upheld the damages because Grey failed to demonstrate that the damages were erroneous.
In reJohnson, 904 F.2d 563
Author: Judge Brorby
The district court reversed defendant Johnson's Chapter 13 Plan.
On appeal, the fundamental issue considered was whether a debtor
whose liability has been discharged on a secured debt in Chapter 7 proceedings may then reschedule that debt in a Chapter 13 proceeding
under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Tenth Circuit held that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan cannot be
confirmed where it improperly schedules a debt previously discharged
under Chapter 7. Therefore, plaintiff, Home State Bank (the "bank"),
no longer held a claim against Johnson for default on his mortgage with
the bank. The court reasoned that Johnson's liability was discharged
under his prior Chapter 7 petition. Further, although the Bankruptcy
Code does not expressly prohibit what this debtor sought to do, Congress did not intend such a result. The court explained that 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(2) applies only to nonrecourse loans. Because the bank and Johnson never bargained for a nonrecourse loan, and since the bank was
given an opportunity to refuse to agree to reaffirmation of the mortgage
in the Chapter 7 proceeding, it cannot subsequently be forced to agree
to reaffirmation by a Chapter 13 plan.
In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendants, Frates, Holmes, Merrick, Doyle and Perma/Frates Joint
Venture ("Defendants"), appealed the district court's order which affirmed an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy
court's order struck Defendants' jury demands. Alternatively, Defendants petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Defendants contended that the
lower courts erred in holding: (1) that by filing an indemnity counterclaim in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding, a defendant consents to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction, thereby waiving his seventh amendment
right to a jury trial; and (2) by filing such proofs of claim or counter-
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claims, the resolution of all claims between the parties was a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal but granted the petition for
a writ of mandamus. First, the court determined that it did not have jurisdiction. The court explained that it found no basis for exercising appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 1291, or 1292(b). The
court, however, construed the request for appellate review as a petition
for a writ of mandamus. In making this determination, the court used a
five part test: (1) was another adequate means to secure relief available
when the appellate jurisdiction was denied; (2) did the district court's
order raise new and important problems or issues of law; (3) was the
petitioning party damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on
appeal; (4) did the district court's order represent an often repeated error, or manifest a persistent disregard of federal rules; and (5) did the
district court's order, denying a jury trial, constitute an abuse of discretion. Further, although bankruptcy judges may have authority to conduct jury trials under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, the 1984 Bankruptcy Act
limits judges' powers to hearings and determinations. Thus, where the
seventh amendment requires ajury trial to be held in a bankruptcy hearing, the jury trial must take place in district court.
Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468
Per Curiam
The Chapter 7 trustee for International Plastics, Incorporated
("IPI"), appealed a summary judgment order for defendant, Travenca
Development Corporation ("Travenca"). IPI argued that Travenca
breached its obligations under a failed Chapter 11 reorganization plan
which was previously confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court ruled that 11
U.S.C. § 1141, which details the effect of confirmation of a reorganization plan, did not bind Travenca to the plan until it acquired property
under the reorganization plan. The court held, however, that there was
evidence in the record creating an issue of material fact that Travenca
may have agreed to be bound by the terms of the reorganization plan
under general contract principles. Further, enforcement and modification provisions in the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to Chapter 11 plans
of reorganization did not preempt a claim for breach of contract premised on a plan of reorganization. Finally, Travenca's affirmative defense of estoppel could not be maintained without showing a
detrimental change in position as a result of reasonable reliance on IPI's
inconsistent conduct during bankruptcy proceedings.
In re Republic Trust and Say. Co., 897 F.2d 1041
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, the bankruptcy trustee, filed adversary proceedings against
defendants, Hackler and others, in an attempt to recover payments
made to them as avoidable preferences. Defendants were holders of
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thrift and passbook savings certificates, issued by the debtors. These
certificates represented the debtors' promise to repay the defendants
money they had invested in the debtors. Defendants redeemed their
certificates and received money from the debtors a short time before the
debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court
and the district court held that all money paid by the debtors to the
defendants, within ninety days of the bankruptcy petition, was an avoidable preference. The defendants appealed on grounds that they were entitled: (1) to judgment as a matter of law because exemptions in the
bankruptcy code negated the trustee's avoidance power; (2) to offset the
debtors' payments against the preferential transfers because they were
denied due process; and (3) to a jury trial.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the defendants were entitled to a jury trial. The court ruled that since the defendants did not
have or file a claim against the bankrupt's estate, they had a right to a
jury trial when sued by the trustee to recover the transfer. The trustee's
actions to avoid the transfers were plenary and did not arise as part of
the process of allowance and disallowance of claims. On the other issues, the court explained that the certificates were merely evidence of an
underlying indebtedness, similar to promissory notes. A creditor's
transfer of a note upon receipt of a debtor's final payment did not constitute a contemporaneous exchange for new value and, therefore, did
not meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1). The court also
found that the defendants had sufficient notice and opportunity to be
heard, so they were not denied due process.
In re Roberts, 906 F.2d 1440
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's ruling in favor
of defendant, Roberts. The government contended that a discharge in
bankruptcy does not discharge tax penalties related to nondischargeable
tax liabilities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that these
penalties are dischargeable. The court said that the plain meaning of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B), is enough to justify discharging the tax penalties related to nondischargeable tax liabilities.
The court also stated that it is not appropriate to refer to the legislative
history since the statutory language is plain and unambiguous. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code is an extensive series of compromises requiring strict adherence to the statutory language.
In re Robinson, 921 F.2d 252
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Edward Robinson ("Edward"), sought discharge of an
obligation to make payments on a second deed of trust, under which he
became solely liable in a divorce proceeding. The deed was subsequently refinanced and assumed by plaintiff, Charlotte Robinson
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("Charlotte"), after Edward ceased making payments. The bankruptcy
judge treated the original obligation as alimony, maintenance, or support and, thus, nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court
also found that Charlotte's refinancing discharged Edward's obligation.
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the
obligation was nondischargeable, but it reversed that bankruptcy court's
decision on the issue of refinancing. The district court ruled that the
current status of the underlying debt had no effect on Edward's original
obligation to be solely liable. Edward subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on
both issues. The court agreed that the record sufficiently supported the
bankruptcy court's finding that the obligation was to be considered alimony, maintenance, or support. Moreover, Edward was still solely liable for the debt on the second deed, except that he was ordered to make
payments to Charlotte rather than to the original creditor bank.
In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 F.2d 1445
Author: Judge Ebel
Seneca Oil Company ("Seneca") sold crude oil in violation of federal pricing regulations. The United States Department of Energy
("DOE") obtained judgment creating a constructive trust for the
amount in excess of the statutory price after Seneca filed for bankruptcy.
DOE appealed the bankruptcy court's plan for reorganization. The district court affirmed the payment of administrative fees but reversed the
confirmation of the plan to the extent that it subordinated the unsecured
portion of the DOE's claim to Bank of New York ("Bank"). The Bank, a
secured creditor of Seneca, appealed, claiming that: (1) DOE did not
establish sufficient wrongdoing by Seneca to justify the imposition of a
constructive trust; (2) DOE did not sufficiently trace the funds in dispute; (3) the district court did not have jurisdiction to decide DOE's
claim under the Bankruptcy Code; and (4) DOE's claim was a "fine,
penalty, or forfeiture" under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Seneca's
overcharging was sufficient wrongdoing in order to establish a constructive trust. Since the excess funds were part of the trust, they were never
part of the bankruptcy estates and, therefore, the payment of administrative fees from the trust was improper. Moreover, the court held that
DOE sufficiently traced the funds in dispute using the "lowest intervening balance rule." The court then held that the district court had jurisdiction, since the DOE's claim did not arise under the Economic
Stabilization Act or the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act. The
DOE's claim for recovery was held not to be a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, DOE's claim for the
excess amounts was not to be subordinated to the claim by the Bank.
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In re Burns, 894 F.2d 361
Author: Judge Seymour
Citizens National Bank brought an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2), to have defendant Burns', debt declared nondischargeable
in a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court ruled that the debt
was dischargeable, but denied Burns' motion for attorneys' fees. Burns
subsequently appealed the denial of his motion, but the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Bums once again appealed,
alleging that he was entitled to attorneys' fees under 11U.S.C. § 523(d).
Using a different rationale, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to deny attorneys' fees. The court noted that pursuant
to 11U.S.C. § 523(d), attorneys' fees can only be awarded if the debt is a
consumer debt and the creditor's position was not substantially justified.
The court concluded that Bums' debt was not consumer debt. The
court explained that a credit transaction is not consumer debt when it is
incurred with a profit motive. Since Burns took out the loan to play the
stock market, this is clearly a transaction entered into with a profit motive. Accordingly, the debt was not a consumer debt, and Bums was not
entitled to attorneys' fees under § 523(d).
In re Simons, 908 F.2d 643
Per Curiam
Defendants, Eugene and Jewell Simons, filed for Chapter 13 relief
in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court, however, denied confirmation of the Simons' proposed reorganization plan. The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination, and the Simonses
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the
matter and consequently dismissed the appeal. The court stated that in
a bankruptcy case, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) limits appellate court review to
district court orders which are final. Because the bankruptcy and district
court orders denying the Simons' plan did not dismiss the underlying
proceeding, its decision was not final for purposes of appeal. Moreover,
the court explained that the district court order did not satisfy two basic
principles of finality. The order becomes final if it either ends the litigation on the merits, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute judgment, or it does not contemplate significant further proceedings in the
bankruptcy court. In addition, the district court order was not appealable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The
court explained that the three requirements were not satisfied. The order appealed from must: (1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action; and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.
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In re Thurman, 901 F.2d 839
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Thurman, previously secured a note payable to defendant, MBank Dallas, with a pledge of 500 shares of WAB, a corporation in
which Thurman held a 50% interest. Thurman defaulted on the note,
and MBank recovered a state court judgment for the amount of indebtedness. Before MBank's judgment became final, WAB transferred all of
its assets to a wholly-owned subsidiary. Thurman then petitioned for
relief under the Bankruptcy Act. MBank objected to the discharge and
filed an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). This statute provides that a discharge is not available where the debtor intended to hinder or defraud a creditor by transferring "property of the debtor" within
one year before filing for the discharge. MBank further argued that the
debt should not be dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6),
which excepts from discharge a debt resulting from "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity." The district court affirmed the conclusion of the bankruptcy
court that the transfer of WAB assets did not constitute a transfer of
Thurman's own property. Accordingly, the district court ruled that
MBank failed to prove grounds for denial of Thurman's discharge.
MBank subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. First, the
court stated that "property of the debtor" is distinct from "property in
which the debtor has a derivative interest." Thus, since Thurman did
not have a direct proprietary interest, the transfer did not constitute a
transfer of his property. Second, the court stated that proof of a deliberate or intentional injury is required to except a debt from discharge.
The court ruled that since Thurman was only a 50% shareholder, he
could not have transferred the assets in his own authority. Consequently, he did not act deliberately and intentionally to injure the security interest held by MBank.
In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592
Per Curiam
Third party defendants, Kevin Abel and Abel & Busch, Incorporated ("Abel"), appealed an order of the district court limiting attorneys' fees due from plaintiff, Landsing Diversified Properties-II
("LDP"), and enjoining Abel from collecting the remaining balance
from a third party. Abel represented LDP when an Oklahoma Public
Service transformer exploded and caused substantial property damage.
After negotiating a hybrid hourly/contingency fee arrangement, Abel
secured his contract fee by filing an attorney's lien under state law.
Before settlement, however, LDP filed bankruptcy and discharged Abel.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in
part. On de novo review, the court held that Abel's claim against LDP
should have begun by: (1) an acknowledgment of LDP's breach; (2) an
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assessment of damages under applicable state law; (3) a determination
under bankruptcy law of reasonableness of Abel's damage claim; and
(4) a reduction of Abel's claim if deemed excessive. Neither the district
court nor the bankruptcy court followed these procedures, so the bankruptcy court's decision was reversed and remanded for reconsideration
in light of the appropriate principles described. Further, the bankruptcy
court's injunction precluding Abel from proceeding against a third-party
that LDP would have to indemnify was affirmed. The injunction, however, is only temporary during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Zilkha v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Zilkha Energy Company ("Zilkha"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its complaint in equity seeking recovery of alleged
overpayments of oil and gas royalties. Zilkha's amended complaint
averred that before it filed for Chapter 11 protection in September
1984, it overpaid royalties to defendant, Leighton, in July 1983. The
district court granted Leighton's motion to dismiss, holding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Bankruptcy
Code was inapplicable because Zilkha was a debtor-in-possession, not a
trustee.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly analyzed Zilkha's bankruptcy claims but, nonetheless, reached the proper
result. The court found that the statute of limitations expired before the
filing of the complaint. The court agreed with Zilkha, however, that the
action may be equitable in nature, and the doctrine of laches might apply. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for consideration of the equity issue because the district court did not consider the doctrine of
laches.

